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CORRECTIONS; SCOTT CARVER, UTAH 
BOARD OF PARDONS; MKE SIBBETT, 
AND BOARD MEMBERS THEREOF, 
Respondents and Appellants. 
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND MILKS 
For purposes of this reply brief, there are no pertinent provisions. 
ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT ALREADY HAS 
RECOGNIZED THAT PETITIONS FOR AN 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT TO THE BOARD CALL FOR 
APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE AGENCY PROCEEDING; 
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT WAS LIMITED TO 
REVIEWING THE RECORD BEFORE THE BOARD AND 
DEFERRING TO ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS, AS IN AN 
APPEAL. 
Walker's protests notwithstanding, the Utah Supreme Court recognizes that review by 
extraordinary writ of board proceedings is appellate in nature. Preece v. House. 252 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 10,12 (Utah 1994)(ruling that Utah Code Ann § 77-27-5(3) (1995) does not preclude judicial 
review by extraordinary writ); Labium yt Utah Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 911 (tt[I]t is 
important to note the unique nature of appellate review of original parole grant determinations.") 
(emphasis added). The word "review" signifies that the court undertaking the review is looking 
at and examining the inferior court or agency action; thus, the court acts in an appellate fashion. 
Denver R.G.W.R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n. 100 P.2d 552, 553-554 (Utah 1940)(use of 
word "review" indicates that court is to study or re-examine agency proceeding). 
In Pebry v. Salt Lake County Bd, Qf Appeals, 764 P.2d 627,628 n.3 (Utah App. 1988), 
this Court noted that when a statute does not permit direct judicial review of a governmental 
action, review can be obtained by extraordinary writ. Here, that analysis is also correct. 
Subsection 77-27-5(3) prohibits judicial review of board actions and decisions; nevertheless, this 
legislative prohibition on direct review does allow a court to review the board's decisions by 
extraordinary writ for procedural due process errors. EtesCE, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12; Foote 
v. Utah Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 735, 735 (Utah 1991). 
Walker fundamentally misunderstands the type of extraordinary writ that serves as the 
basis for his petition. The writ of habeas corpus simply is not at issue in this case and, in fact, 
does not exist in Utah. $££. Utah R. Civ.P. 65B (1991) (amended 1993). Article 1, section 5 of 
the Utah Constitution enshrines the common law writ of habeas corpus, which was available only 
2 
to release persons imprisoned by a court that lacked jurisdiction. Andrews v. Swartz. 156 U.S. 
272, 274 (1895); In re Clark, 78 P. 475 (Utah 1904)(habeas corpus available only to review 
jurisdictional authority of the inferior court).1 Subject to procedural due process limitations, the 
board has sole jurisdiction and absolute discretion to administer the parole system and determine 
whether a person has violated his agreement. Preece, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12; Lancaster v. 
Utah Board of Pardons. 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994). Had the trial court actually analyzed 
Walker's petition under the law relevant to common law habeas corpus, which is enshrined in the 
state constitution, it would have had to dismiss the petition because of the board's unquestioned 
jurisdiction over Walker's parole. 
Because Walker misconstrues the conceptual underpinnings of extraordinary writ actions 
against the board, his remaining arguments are flawed. Further, his assertion that the 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard may eventually be found unconstitutional has no 
support. (Brief of Appellee at 17). The Colorado case to which he refers, People v. White. 804 
P.2d 247 (Colo. App. 1990), did not hold that "beyond a reasonable doubt" is constitutionally 
required in parole revocation cases based on criminal conduct. In Colorado, that high standard 
is mandated by statute. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 17-2-103(9)(a) (Supp. 1994). Because Colorado law 
does not bind Utah courts, White most likely will never lead to the overturning of the Utah 
Supreme Court case that established preponderance of the evidence as the correct evidentiary 
1
 Even though Utah courts may have expanded use of the term "habeas corpus" to include other sorts 
of remedies, Hurst v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Utah 1989), that expansion cannot retrospectively apply to the 
habeas corpus mentioned in the constitution. Doing so would inappropriately substitute the thinking of current courts 
for the intention of the people who enacted tue constitution in 1895. 
3 
standard in parole revocation hearings. Johns v. Shulsen. 717 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 
1986)(parole revocations are civil proceedings; therefore, a "parole violation may be established 
by a preponderance of the evidence.") The lohns case is precisely on point here because the 
board found in its parole revocation hearing that Johns had committed criminal conduct, even 
though he had been acquitted in the criminal court. I$L 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, this Court should vacate the trial court's order and remand solely for 
entry of an order denying Walker's request for relief and dismissing the petition. 
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JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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